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EDITOR'S NOTE: This article is excerpted, with
permission of Oxford University Press, Inc., from
ARBITRARY JUSTICE: The Power of the American
Prosecutor, by Angela J. Davis. Copyright © 2007 by
Oxford University Press, Inc. The book is available in
bookstores, at www.oup.com/us, or by calling (800)
445-9714.
elma Banks was convicted of capital murder in
Texas and sentenced to death. Just 10 minutes be-
fore he was scheduled to die, the United States Su-
preme Court stopped his execution and a year later reversed
his sentence. The Court found that the prosecutors in his
case withheld crucial exculpatory evidence.
Dwayne Washington was charged with assault with
intent to kill and armed burglary in the juvenile court of
Washington, D.C. Two adults were arrested with Dwayne
and prosecuted in adult court. The prosecutors in the adult
cases threatened to charge Dwayne as an adult if he refused
to testify against the adults. When Dwayne said he could
not testify against them because he didn't know anything
about the crime, the prosecutors charged him as an adult,
and he faced charges that carried a maximum sentence of
life in an adult prison.
Andrew Klepper lived in Montgomery County, a suburb
of Washington, D.C. He was arrested for attacking a woman
with a baseball bat, sodomizing her at knifepoint with the
same bat, and stealing more than $2,000 from her. The pros-
ecutors in his case agreed to a plea bargain in which An-
drew would plead guilty to reduced charges. As part of the
agreement, Andrew would be placed on probation and sent
to an out-of-state facility for severely troubled youth, where
he would be in a locked facility for six to eight weeks, fol-
lowed by intensive group therapy in an outdoor setting.
Andrew's parents-a lawyer and a school guidance coun-
selor-agreed to foot the bill. Andrew's two accomplices-
whose involvement in the crime was much less serious than
Andrew's-each served time in jail.
All three of these cases illustrate the wide-ranging power
and discretion of the American prosecutor. In each case, the
prosecutor's actions profoundly affected the lives of the ac-
cused. Banks was almost executed by the State of Texas
before the Supreme Court reversed his conviction. When
Dwayne Washington told prosecutors he couldn't help
them, they followed through on their threat to charge him
as an adult and he faced charges that carried a life sentence
in adult prison. The favorable treatment afforded Andrew
Klepper allowed him to avoid prison after committing a
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violent sex offense-a rare occurrence in these types of
cases.
The Supreme Court ultimately found that the prosecu-
tors in Banks's case engaged in misconduct by failing to
turn over exculpatory evidence, but the prosecutors were
neither punished nor reprimanded. A trial judge found the
prosecutor's behavior in Dwayne Washington's case to be
vindictive and dismissed the charges against him. The pros-
ecutor's decision in Andrew Klepper's case was never chal-
lenged; in fact, there was no legal basis for doing so.
I was a public defender at the Public Defender Service
for the District of Columbia (PDS) for 12 years. It was then
that I learned of the formidable power and vast discretion
of prosecutors. During my years at PDS, I noticed that pros-
ecutors held almost all of the cards, and that they seemed to
deal them as they saw fit. Although some saw themselves
as ministers of justice and measured their decisions care-
fully, very few were humbled by the power they held. Most
wanted to win every case, and winning meant getting a con-
viction. In one of its more famous criminal cases, the U.S.
Supreme Court, quoting a former solicitor general, stated
that "the Government wins its point when justice is done in
its courts." (Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 n.2 (1963.)
A paraphrased version of this quotation is inscribed on the
walls of the U.S. Department of Justice: "The United States
wins its point whenever justice is done its citizens in the
courts." Yet most prosecutors with whom I had experience
seemed to focus almost exclusively on securing convic-
tions, without consideration of whether a conviction would
result in the fairest or most satisfactory result for the ac-
cused or even the victim.
During my years as a public defender, I saw disparities in
the way prosecutors handled individual cases. Cases involv-
ing educated, well-to-do victims were frequently prosecut-
ed more vigorously than cases involving poor, uneducated
victims. The very few white defendants represented by my
office sometimes appeared to receive preferential treatment
from prosecutors. Although I saw no evidence of intentional
discrimination based on race or class, the consideration of
class- and race-neutral factors in the prosecutorial process
often produced disparate results along class and race lines.
Sometimes neither race nor class defined the disparate
treatment. At times it simply appeared that two similarly
situated people were treated differently. Why did the pros-
ecutor choose to give a plea bargain to one defendant and
not another charged with the same offense? If there were a
difference in prior criminal history or some other relevant
factor, the disparate treatment would be explainable. But
without a difference in the legitimate factors that prosecu-
tors are permitted to consider in making these decisions,
the disparities seemed unfair. Yet I saw such disparities all
the time.
Prosecutors are the most powerful officials in the crimi-
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nal justice system. Their routine, everyday decisions con-
trol the direction and outcome of criminal cases and have
greater impact and more serious consequences than those
of any other criminal justice official. The most remarkable
feature of these important, sometimes life-and-death de-
cisions is that they are totally discretionary and virtually
unreviewable.
Prosecutors make the most important of these discre-
tionary decisions behind closed doors and answer only to
other prosecutors. Even elected prosecutors, who presum-
ably answer to the electorate, escape accountability, in part
because their most important responsibilities- particularly
the charging and plea bargaining decisions-are shielded
from public view.
When prosecutors engage in misconduct, as in the cases
of Delma Banks and Dwayne Washington, they rarely face
consequences for their actions. Delma Banks almost lost his
two individuals involved in a fistfight. Such an observation
provides probable cause to arrest the individuals. Yet the
officer has the discretion to break up the fight, resolve the
conflict between the individuals, and send them on their
way without making an arrest. Such an exercise of discre-
tion may well be in the interest of justice for all involved
and would save the valuable resources of the court system
for other, more serious offenses.
Traffic stops are among the most common of discretion-
ary police decisions. There are hundreds of potential traffic
violations, and every motorist commits at least a few each
time he or she drives. Failing to come to a complete stop at
a stop sign, driving over the speed limit, and changing lanes
without signaling are just a few of the most common traffic
violations for which police officers may issue tickets. They
also are permitted to arrest drivers for some traffic viola-
tions, but are rarely required to do so. Few people would
The most remarkable feature of these decisions is that
they are totally discretionary and virtually unreviewable.
life, and Dwayne Washington lost his liberty and suffered
the many other damaging effects of criminal prosecution,
but their prosecutors just moved on to the next case. As for
Andrew Klepper, perhaps he should have been afforded the
opportunity to receive treatment and rehabilitation, but fair-
ness demands that other similarly situated youth receive the
same or similar opportunities. Current laws and policies do
not require equitable treatment.
Prosecutors certainly are not the only criminal justice
officials who make important, discretionary decisions. Dis-
cretion is a hallmark of the criminal justice system, and
officials at almost every stage of the process exercise dis-
cretion in the performance of their duties and responsibili-
ties. In fact, without such discretion, there would be many
more unjust decisions at every stage of the criminal pro-
cess. A system without discretion, in which police, judges,
and prosecutors were not permitted to take into account the
individual facts, circumstances, and characteristics of each
case, would undoubtedly produce unjust results.
Police officers, for example, who are most often at the
front line of the criminal process, routinely exercise discre-
tion when making decisions about whether to stop, search,
or arrest a suspect. Although they are permitted to arrest
an individual upon a showing of probable cause to believe
he or she has committed a crime, they are not required to
do so, and frequently do not. A police officer may observe
support a law that required police officers to stop and issue
a ticket to every person who committed a traffic violation
or to arrest every person who committed an arrestable traf-
fic violation. In addition to the unpopularity of such a law,
most would agree that the limited resources of most crimi-
nal justice systems should be preserved for more serious
offenses.
Although discretion in the exercise of the police func-
tion appears necessary and desirable, the discretionary na-
ture of police stops and arrests sometimes produces unjust,
discriminatory results. When police officers exercise their
discretion to stop or arrest blacks or Latinos but not whites
who are engaging in the same behavior, they are engaging
in racial profiling-a practice that has been widely criti-
cized and even outlawed in some jurisdictions. Thus, the
discretion granted to police officers to make reasonable de-
cisions in individual cases also sometimes produces unfair
disparities along racial lines. Although the laws and policies
passed to eliminate racial profiling may not totally control
police discretion, they demonstrate society's recognition
that such discretion must be scrutinized to ensure fairness
in our criminal justice system.
Judges exercise discretion in the criminal justice system
as well. It is the role of the judge to make decisions in in-
dividual cases about everything from whether a particular
defendant should be detained before trial to what sentence
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the defendant should receive if convicted of a crime. Judges
who preside over trials must make decisions throughout
the trial about numerous issues, including whether particu-
lar pieces of evidence should be admitted and whether to
sustain or overrule objections. Although there are laws and
rules that govern many of these decisions, most of them
involve the exercise of judicial discretion. In fact, the stan-
dard appellate courts often use when reviewing a decision
of a trial judge is whether his or her decision was "an abuse
of discretion." (See, e.g., General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522
U.S. 136 (1997).)
Judges, however, like police officers, have been criticized
widely for their discretionary decisions. Ifajudge releases a
defendant pending the trial date and the defendant is arrest-
ed for another crime, the judge is criticized for exercising
discretion poorly. Judges have received the most criticism
for their sentencing decisions, primarily from individuals
who have complained that a judge's sentence was not harsh
enough in a particular case. In fact, widespread criticism of
the exercise of judicial discretion resulted in the institution
of mandatory minimum and sentencing guideline schemes
in the federal government and many states. Like police of-
ficers, judges were accused of treating similarly situated
defendants differently. Proponents of mandatory minimum
sentencing laws and sentencing guidelines argued that
all defendants who committed certain offenses should be
sentenced to the same period of incarceration, regardless
of other factors such as their socioeconomic background,
education or lack thereof, or other factors that are unrelated
to the offense. These laws severely curtailed, and in some
instances, entirely eliminated, judicial discretion.
Discretionary parole and pardon decisions also have
been the object of harsh criticism. Highly publicized cas-
es of individuals committing violent crimes after parole
boards made discretionary release decisions were partially
responsible for the elimination of parole in the federal sys-
tem and in many states. Governors and the president may
exercise their discretion to pardon individuals who have
been convicted of crimes. However, several presidents in
recent history were severely criticized for exercising this
discretionary power.
Just about every official who exercises power and dis-
cretion in the criminal justice system has been criticized,
held accountable, and, in some instances, stripped of some
of his or her power and discretion for making discretionary
decisions that produce disparate or unfair results, with one
exception-the prosecutor. Although numerous scholars in
the legal academy have criticized the unchecked exercise of
prosecutorial discretion, with a few exceptions, public criti-
cism of prosecutors has been almost entirely absent. The
U.S. Supreme Court consistently has deferred to and af-
firmed prosecutorial discretion. The legislative branch has
acted accordingly. Most of the criminal laws passed by state
legislatures and the U.S. Congress have served to increase
rather than reduce prosecutorial power.
If prosecutors always made decisions that were legal,
fair, and equitable, their power and discretion would be less
problematic. But, as has been demonstrated with police of-
ficers, judges, parole officers, and presidents, the exercise
of discretion often leads to dissimilar treatment of similarly
situated people. This is no less true for prosecutors than for
any other government agent or official. In fact, since pros-
ecutors are widely recognized as the most powerful officials
in the criminal justice system, arguably they should be held
more accountable than other officials, not less. However, for
reasons that are not entirely clear, the judiciary, the legisla-
ture, and the general public have given prosecutors a pass.
Prosecutors' power and discretion have not been reduced,
even when their decisions have produced grave injustices
in the criminal justice system, and the mechanisms of ac-
countability that purport to hold them accountable have
proven largely ineffective.
The importance of prosecutorial discretion
Prosecutorial discretion is essential to the operation of our
criminal justice system, despite the potential for abuse. So-
ciety, through the legislature, criminalizes certain behav-
iors and provides a process for holding people accountable
when they commit crimes. The prosecutor's duty is to use
discretion in making the all-important decision of whether
an individual should be charged, which charges to bring,
and whether and how to plea bargain. If the accused choos-
es to exercise his or her constitutional right to a trial, the
prosecutor represents the state in that trial. The criminal jus-
tice system is adversarial by design. Ideally, a capable and
zealous defense attorney represents the accused, and a simi-
larly capable prosecutor represents the state. If both sides
have sufficient resources and follow the rules, the criminal
process should work fairly and produce a fair result. But
the process is not that simple, nor is the theory always real-
ized in practice. Most people charged with crimes are rep-
resented by public defenders or court-appointed attorneys
who do not have sufficient resources to provide an adequate
defense. Some prosecutors don't always follow the rules,
and some defense attorneys don't work hard enough for
their clients. To complicate matters even more, prosecutors
have a special, very different role in the criminal process.
Their duty is not to simply represent the state in the pursuit
of a conviction but to pursue justice. "Doing justice" some-
times involves seeking a conviction and incarceration, but
at other times, it might involve dismissing a criminal case
or forgoing a prosecution. These decisions, however, are
left to the prosecutor's discretion. Without enforceable laws
or policies to guide that discretion, all too often it is exer-
cised haphazardly at worst and arbitrarily at best, resulting
in inequitable treatment of both victims and defendants.
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Discretion is as necessary to the prosecution function as
it is to the police and judicial functions. It is difficult to
imagine a fair and workable system that does not include
some level of measured discretion in the prosecutorial pro-
cess. As a part of the executive branch of government, it is
the prosecutor's duty to enforce the laws, and it would be
virtually impossible to perform this essential function with-
out exercising discretion.
One of the reasons prosecutorial discretion is so essential
to the criminal justice system is the proliferation of criminal
statutes in all 50 states and the federal government. Legisla-
tures pass laws criminalizing a vast array of behaviors, and
some of these laws, such as fornication and adultery, for ex-
ample, stay on the books long after social mores about these
behaviors have changed. In addition, some offenses warrant
prosecution in some instances but not others. For example,
it may be reasonable to bring a prosecution in a jurisdiction
that criminalizes gambling for someone engaged in a large-
scale operation but not for individuals placing small bets
during a Saturday night poker game in a private home. In
addition, in some cases, the evidence may not be sufficient
to meet the government's heavy burden of proving guilt be-
yond a reasonable doubt. Without discretion, prosecutors
might be required to bring criminal charges in cases that
most people would view as frivolous and in cases where the
evidence is weak or lacking in credibility.
Other closely related reasons why prosecutorial discretion
is so essential are the limitation on resources and the need
for individualized justice. There are not enough resources in
any local criminal justice system to prosecute every alleged
criminal offense. Of course, with every prosecution comes
the corresponding need for defense attorneys, judges, and
other court personnel, and if there is a conviction, possibly
prison facilities. Some entity must decide which offenses
should be prosecuted, and prosecutors are presumably best
suited to make these judgments. Most would agree that the
state's limited resources should be used to prosecute serious
and/or strong cases, while minor or weak cases should be
dismissed or resolved short of prosecution.
Just prosecutions require a consideration of the individu-
al facts and circumstances of each case. All defendants and
crime victims are not the same. Similarly, there are signifi-
cant differences between perpetrators and victims of partic-
ular types of crimes. For example, some robbers have long
criminal histories while others are first offenders or provide
minor assistance to more serious offenders. Some assault
victims are totally innocent of wrongdoing while others
may have provoked their assailants with their own criminal
behavior. These examples illustrate just a few of the many
factors that should be considered in deciding whether, and
to what extent, a case should be prosecuted.
Despite the obvious need for the exercise of discretion at
this stage of the criminal process, one might question why
we delegate this important function to prosecutors and why
we don't provide more oversight by the judiciary or some
other entity. The most common answer has to do with the
separation of powers. As part of the executive branch of
government, prosecutors have been granted the power and
responsibility to enforce the laws. (U.S. CONST. art. II § 3.)
Courts have consistently deferred to the expertise of pros-
ecutors in declining to question their motives for charging
and other important prosecutorial decisions. The Supreme
Court explains this deference as follows:
This broad discretion rests largely on the recognition
that the decision to prosecute is particularly ill-suited
to judicial review. Such factors as the strength of the
case, the prosecution's general deterrence value, the
Government's enforcement priorities, and the case's
relationship to the Government's overall enforcement
plan are not readily susceptible to the kind of analysis
the courts are competent to undertake. Judicial super-
vision in this area, moreover, entails systemic costs
of particular concern. Examining the basis of a pros-
ecution delays the criminal proceeding, threatens to
chill law enforcement by subjecting the prosecutor's
motives and decision making to outside inquiry, and
may undermine prosecutorial effectiveness by reveal-
ing the Government's enforcement policy.
(Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985).)
The Court is concerned that too much interference with the
prosecutor's responsibilities might interfere with the en-
forcement of the criminal laws, either because prosecutors
might decline some prosecutions for fear ofjudicial reprisal
or because judicial review or requiring prosecutors to ex-
plain their decisions to some other entity might result in law
enforcement secrets being revealed to criminals.
The dilemma of prosecutorial discretion
All of the reasons in support of prosecutorial discretion
explain why it is so essential, but they do not address the
problems that have resulted from the failure to monitor how
that discretion is exercised. In their effort to give prosecu-
tors the freedom and independence to enforce the law, the
judicial and legislative branches of government have failed
to perform the kind of checks and balances essential to a
fair and effective democracy. Consequently, prosecutors,
unlike judges, parole boards, and even other entities within
the executive branch such as police, presidents, and gover-
nors, have escaped the kind of scrutiny and accountability
that we demand of public officials in a democratic society.
Prosecutors have been left to regulate themselves, and, not
surprisingly, such self-regulation has been either nonexis-
tent or woefully inadequate.
There have been some efforts to promote the fair and eq-
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uitable exercise of prosecutorial discretion, but these efforts
have been minimal and largely ineffective. For example,
the Criminal Justice Section of the American Bar Associa-
tion (ABA) promulgates standards of practice for judges,
defense attorneys, and prosecutors. The standards for pros-
ecutors address how prosecutors should perform their most
important responsibilities, with the goal of assuring that
prosecutors exercise their discretion fairly and in a way that
will promote the administration of justice. However, these
standards are aspirational. No prosecutor is required to fol-
low or even consider them. The Justice Department also
sets standards and guidelines for federal prosecutors in its
U.S. attorney's manual. However, like the ABA standards,
the extent to which individual prosecutors follow these
guidelines is left to the U.S. attorneys in each district or, in
some instances, to the attorney general of the United States.
There is no legal requirement that federal prosecutors act
in accordance with the U.S. attorney's manual, nor are they
accountable to anyone outside the Department of Justice if
justice officials whose discretionary decisions contribute to
unfair disparities, their decisions carry greater consequenc-
es and are most difficult to challenge.
Most prosecutors join the profession with the goal of do-
ing justice and serving their communities, and most work
hard to perform their responsibilities fairly, without bias or
favoritism. But even well-meaning prosecutors often fail
because they exercise discretion arbitrarily and without
guidance or standards, under the daily pressures of over-
whelming caseloads in a system with inadequate represen-
tation for most defendants, and judges who are more inter-
ested in efficiency than justice. The absence of meaningful
standards and effective methods of accountability has re-
sulted in widely accepted prosecutorial practices that play
a significant role in producing many of the injustices in the
criminal justice system.
It is important that prosecutors make charging and plea
bargaining decisions on the basis of the facts and circum-
stances of individual cases to achieve individualized jus-
Even well-meaning prosecutors often fail because
they exercise discretion without guidance or standards.
and when they fail to follow their own rules. Similarly, in-
dividual state and local prosecutors may establish policies
and standards of practice in their offices, but they are not
required to do so, and most don't. Although a few states (for
example, Maryland and West Virginia) have passed laws
that establish standards for prosecutors, there is virtually no
public accountability when the standards are not followed.
Proponents of the current system of prosecution argue
that prosecutors are held accountable to the people through
the electoral system. They maintain that if prosecutors do
not perform their duties and responsibilities fairly and ef-
fectively, they will be voted out of office. However, the
electoral system and other mechanisms of accountability
have proven to be ineffective.
The lack of enforceable standards and effective account-
ability to the public has resulted in decision making that of-
ten appears arbitrary, especially during the critical charging
and plea bargaining stages of the process. These decisions
result in tremendous disparities among similarly situated
people, sometimes along race and/or class lines. The rich
and white, if they are charged at all, are less likely to go to
prison than the poor and black or brown-even when the
evidence of criminal behavior is equally present or absent.
Although prosecutors certainly are not the only criminal
tice. But when they do so without meaningful guidance,
standards, or supervision, their decisions become more ar-
bitrary than individualized, and deep-seated, unconscious
views about race and class are more likely to affect the
decision-making process. It is not enough for prosecutors
to base their decisions on the malleable standard of "doing
justice" because such a standard is subjective and ultimately
produces unexplainable and unjustifiable disparities.
The goal should be to establish practices that promote
the goals of individualized justice without producing unfair
disparities among similarly situated defendants and vic-
tims of crime. So far, despite the worthy intentions of many
hard-working prosecutors, frequently that goal is not being
met. Even well-meaning prosecutors routinely engage in
practices that produce unfair results-practices that are hid-
den from the public, and even when revealed, are somehow
accepted as legitimate.
The criminal justice system is important to all of us.
Some of us and members of our families will have the un-
fortunate experience of being crime victims or criminal de-
fendants. Most will be fortunate enough to avoid personal
involvement with the system. But everyone has an interest
in assuring the fair and just operation of a system with the
power to deprive liberty and life. Everyone who believes in
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democracy has a vested interest in assuring that no one indi-
vidual or institution exercises power without accountability
to the people. For some reason, we have given prosecutors
a pass-allowing them to circumvent the scrutiny and ac-
countability that we ordinarily require of those to whom we
grant power and privilege while affording them more power
than any other government official. We have become com-
placent, affording trust without requiring responsibility. The
time has come to focus on prosecutors, require information,
and, most important, institute fundamental reforms that will
result in more fairness in the performance of the prosecu-
tion function.
Unfair deals
Andrew Klepper. The media discovered and reported the
arrest and prosecution of Andrew Klepper, a white, middle-
class young man who lived in a Maryland suburb outside
Washington, D.C., with his parents. His father was a law-
yer, and his mother was a high school guidance counselor.
Andrew attended a prestigious high school with a reputa-
tion for high achievement among its students. When he was
15, Andrew and two friends who attended the same school
hired a prostitute, invited her to Andrew's home, and pro-
ceeded to brutally assault and rob her. They struck her with
a baseball bat, sodomized her with the bat handle and a
large ink marker, and robbed her of more than $2,000.
Andrew was charged as an adult with first-degree sex
offense, conspiracy to commit a first-degree sex offense,
armed robbery, and conspiracy to commit armed robbery.
All of these charges carry a maximum penalty of life in
prison in the State of Maryland. The evidence against An-
drew was overwhelming and included his own confession
to the crimes.
Despite the horrific nature of the crimes, Andrew Klep-
per never served a day in prison. The prosecutor offered him
a deal that involved his guilty plea to robbery, first-degree
assault, and fourth-degree sexual offense. The prosecutor
also agreed to support a suspension of his prison term and
a five-year term of probation so that he could enroll in a fa-
cility for troubled youth in Tennessee called Peninsula Vil-
lage. Peninsula Village treats severely troubled youth with
six to eight weeks in a locked admissions unit followed by
intensive group therapy in an outdoor setting. As part of the
agreement, Klepper would spend an additional 18 months
at Peninsula before enrolling in an unspecified boarding
school that specializes in treating troubled youth. Klep-
per's parents agreed to pay for the cost of the treatment.
Ultimately, the Tennessee authorities declined to supervise
Klepper's probation, so the Maryland judge resentenced
Klepper and placed him on unsupervised probation so he
could receive the rehabilitative treatment at the Tennessee
facility.
First offenders are frequently offered deals that result in
a probationary sentence, but rarely if they commit very se-
rious offenses, and Klepper's crimes were among the most
serious. Furthermore, Klepper's involvement in the offense
was much more destructive than that of his codefendants.
According to the victim, he seemed to be the leader of the
group, and he performed the most heinous act-the sod-
omy with the baseball bat and marker. Yet, ironically, he
was the only one of the three boys to avoid imprisonment.
His 19-year-old less culpable accomplice, Young Jiun Song,
was not present during the sexual assault and received a
four-year sentence. Even the 14-year-old accomplice,
whose case was transferred to juvenile court, was detained
in a juvenile facility.
Did Klepper's social status, wealth, and possibly his
race influence the prosecutor's decision to offer him such
a lenient plea bargain? It certainly may be reasonable to
provide rehabilitative services rather than punishment for a
juvenile first time offender. But if Andrew Klepper was de-
serving of such help, then so are other young first offenders
charged with the same offenses.
The prosecutor might respond that he gave Klepper a
break because his parents found and paid for an alternative
that provided rehabilitative services and that he would have
given a similar break to other similarly situated defendants,
regardless of their race or socioeconomic background, had
they proposed to provide a similar appropriate alternative.
The prosecutor might further argue that it is not his role to
secure alternatives to incarceration for criminal defendants
and that he is not responsible for the inequities in society
that divide people along socioeconomic lines. Why should
Andrew Klepper be denied rehabilitative treatment because
others in his situation cannot afford it?
These arguments have some force, but they may not tell
the whole story. Could the prosecutor have agreed to the
plea bargain because he empathized with Andrew Klepper
and his parents? Klepper's parents were well-educated pro-
fessionals who hired a well-known criminal defense attor-
ney to represent their son. Klepper was a popular student at
one of the best high schools in the county. He was bound for
college and had a bright future. Could the prosecutor have
looked at Andrew and his parents and seen a life and family
worth saving? Would the prosecutor have offered the same
deal to a poor, African-American male with no family sup-
port, no education, and no foreseeable future? The reality is
that the poor African-American male would never be able
to afford such services, so prosecutors are rarely compelled
to confront these issues.
The fact that few if any governmental entities provide
free programs or services to treat defendants with problems
and needs like those of Andrew Klepper is an indication that
legislatures do not support such alternatives for individuals
who commit crimes this serious. The legislatures may be
shortsighted or just plain wrong, but should an individual
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like Klepper be allowed to buy his way out of punishment
with the assistance of the prosecutor while others who may
be just as deserving of help are sent to prison?
Erma Faye Stewart. Erma Faye Stewart's case was
much more typical. Stewart was a poor African-American
woman with very limited education and even less under-
standing of the criminal justice system. She was arrested
on November 2, 2000, in Hearne, Texas, for drug distribu-
tion on the word of a confidential informant who later was
proven to have lied. She was held in jail on a $70,000 bond
pending the outcome of her case.
Stewart proclaimed her innocence steadfastly from the
moment she was arrested. Nonetheless, her court-appointed
attorney urged her to accept the prosecutor's plea offer. He
told her that if she did not take the plea, she would be fac-
ing a 10-year prison term. When Stewart told her lawyer
that she couldn't plead guilty to something she didn't do, he
became impatient with her. According to Stewart,
He was, like, pushing me to take the probation. He
wasn't on my side at all. He wasn't trying to hear
me. He wasn't trying to explain nothing to me. And
I even had told him, you know, "My understanding,
you know, is not that good, so, you know, you're just
going to have to really break it down to me, for me to
understand."
(Frontline, The Plea (PBS television show, June 17, 2004),
www.pbs.org).)
Stewart's lawyer told her that if she pled guilty, she
would be released and placed on probation. After almost a
month in jail, she decided to plead guilty to something she
insisted she didn't do.
Even though I wasn't guilty, I was willing to plead
guilty because I had to go home to my kids. My son
was sick. And I asked him, "Listen, now, you know-
you know, I can plead for five-year probation. You
know, just-just let me go home to my kids."
(Id.)
On the date of her guilty plea hearing, Stewart learned that
the prosecutor insisted on a 10-year period of probation.
Desperate to go home, she agreed and pled guilty. The
judge imposed a fine and court costs. Three years after the
plea, Stewart was working as a cook making $5.25 per hour.
She was evicted from the housing project where she and her
children had lived, and they were put in foster care. Because
of her conviction, she was ineligible for food stamps or fed-
eral aid to pursue an education. She won't be able to vote
until two years after her 10-year period of probation has
ended. Needless to say, she was not able to pay the $1,000
fine or the court and probation costs.
Stewart was one of 25 people who were arrested on the
word of the same confidential informant. The first trial of
one who declined to plead guilty started on February 19,
2001. It was soon revealed that the informant had lied, and
within a few weeks, all of the remaining cases were dis-
missed. Had Stewart not pled guilty, her case would have
been dismissed as well. The prosecutor offered no assis-
tance and expressed no regrets.
Obviously, many people who plead guilty actually com-
mitted the offense to which they admit guilt. But Erma Faye
Stewart's case illustrates the pressures that many defendants
feel when facing long prison terms, especially when they
are detained prior to their trials. Unfortunately, most de-
fendants have lawyers more like Stewart's than Klepper's,
without the time, resources, or desire to investigate the case
and mount a viable defense, and prosecutors who are more
than willing to offer a plea even when they are not confident
that they can prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. No one
should plead guilty under these circumstances, but it hap-
pens frequently.
Prosecutorial misconduct: the abuse of power
and discretion
Brian was a 15-year-old African-American boy charged in
the District of Columbia juvenile court with assault with
intent to kill, burglary, and related charges. The government
claimed that Brian and two adult men had severely beaten
an older man during a burglary of his home. Brian's adult
codefendants were charged with the same offenses and
faced up to life in prison in adult court, where the office of
the U.S. attorney for the District of Columbia prosecuted
them. As a juvenile, the Office of the Corporation Counsel
prosecuted Brian, and he faced a maximum punishment of
two years in the juvenile correctional facility upon convic-
tion. The juvenile court rules protected his anonymity and
offered the possibility of rehabilitative treatment if needed.
The assistant U.S. attorney (AUSA) handling the case
against the adult codefendants sought Brian's assistance in
their prosecution. He contacted the assistant corporation
counsel in charge of Brian's case and Brian's court-appoint-
ed attorney to arrange an "off-the-record" conversation. The
prosecutor hoped to secure Brian's cooperation in the prose-
cution of the adults in exchange for lenient treatment, includ-
ing possible dismissal of Brian's case. During the meeting,
the prosecutor questioned Brian about the events surrounding
the assault and burglary. Brian's attorney and mother were
present during the meeting. Brian denied that either he or the
adult codefendants had participated in the crimes.
The prosecutor expressed his displeasure with Brian's
denials and pressured him to testify that the adults were
involved. When Brian refused to submit to pressure, the
prosecutor threatened to charge Brian as an adult if he de-
clined to testify against the codefendants, warning him that
CRIMINAL JUSTICE N SPRING 2008
he could receive a life sentence in an adult prison if con-
victed in adult court. Brian maintained that he knew nothing
about the offenses, and the meeting ended without a deal.
Soon thereafter, the prosecutor made good on his threats.
The juvenile case was dismissed, and Brian was charged
as an adult.
I was appointed to represent Brian in adult court. He im-
mediately told me about the meeting with the prosecutor. I
interviewed his mother, who verified the prosecutor's threats
and expressed her shock and dismay at what the prosecutor
had done. "Can he get away with that?" she asked. I agreed
that his behavior was unscrupulous, and after consulting
with other lawyers at PDS, I decided to file a motion to dis-
miss the indictment for prosecutorial vindictiveness.
The judge assigned to Brian's case scheduled a hearing,
and Brian's mother testified. She described the prosecutor's
threats in great detail, explaining how he had yelled at Brian
and had threatened to charge Brian as an adult if he did
not corroborate the government's story that he had helped
the two adults beat and rob the complainant. The prosecu-
tor representing the government at the hearing was not the
same prosecutor who had threatened Brian. To my surprise,
he declined to cross-examine Brian's mother. Instead, he
began to argue, in a very dismissive manner, that Brian's
mother was lying and that the threats were never made.
The judge interrupted the prosecutor's argument and asked
whether he planned to present any evidence. The prosecutor
appeared surprised and informed the judge that he would
just "make representations" as an officer of the court. This
prosecutor apparently believed that he was not required to
present testimony under oath and that the judge should sim-
ply accept his word to rebut the testimony of Brian's moth-
er. When it became clear that the judge planned to follow
the rules of evidence and only consider the undisputed tes-
timony of Brian's mother, the prosecutor asked if he might
have additional time to locate the prosecutor and present his
testimony. The judge declined his request.
The hearing ended late on a Friday afternoon, and Bri-
an's trial was scheduled to begin the following Monday
morning. The judge declined to rule on the motion, indi-
cating that she would take the matter under advisement. I
warned my client and his mother that they should not get
their hopes up, that these motions were rarely granted, and
that we should prepare to start the trial on Monday.
On the following Monday morning, the case was called,
and my client and I joined the adult codefendants and their
lawyers at counsel table. The case had been assigned to
another judge. He looked in my client's court file and an-
nounced, "Ms. Davis, your client's case has been dismissed.
There is an order issued by Judge Williams granting your
motion to dismiss the indictment for prosecutorial vindic-
tiveness." I was shocked. Although I had challenged pros-
ecutorial misconduct on many occasions during my years as
a public defender, this was the only time a judge granted the
relief I had requested.
The vindictiveness in Brian's case is just one of the
many forms of prosecutorial misconduct and is by no means
the most common. Numerous articles and books have
been written about prosecutorial misconduct. (See, e.g., Jo-
SEPH F. LAWLESS, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT (2003); SCOTT
CHRISTIANSON, INNOCENCE: INSIDE WRONGFUL CONVICTION
CASES (2004).) Such misconduct may take many forms,
including:
" Courtroom misconduct (making inappropriate or
inflammatory comments in the presence of the jury;
introducing or attempting to introduce inadmissible,
inappropriate, or inflammatory evidence; mischar-
acterizing the evidence or the facts of the case to the
court or jury; committing violations pertaining to
the selection of the jury; or making improper clos-
ing arguments);
" Mishandling of physical evidence (hiding, destroy-
ing, or tampering with evidence, case files or court
records);
" Failing to disclose exculpatory evidence;
" Threatening, badgering, or tampering with witnesses;
" Using false or misleading evidence;
" Harassing, displaying bias toward, or having a ven-
detta against the defendant or defendant's counsel
(including selective or vindictive prosecution, which
includes instances of denial of a speedy trial); and
" Improper behavior during grand jury proceedings.
(Steve Weinberg & Center for Public Integrity, Breaking the
Rules: Who Suffers When a Prosecutor Is Cited for Miscon-
duct? (2003) available at www.publicintegrity.org.)
I do not attempt to present a comprehensive discussion
of prosecutorial misconduct here, as such a task would be
impossible in light of the breadth of the problem. Instead,
I attempt to demonstrate that the line between legal pros-
ecutorial behavior and illegal prosecutorial misconduct is a
thin one. I explore whether a number of factors, including
the Supreme Court's jurisprudence and the prosecutorial
culture of power and lack of accountability, create a climate
that fosters misconduct. I focus on Brady violations-the
most common form of misconduct-and examine how and
why prosecutors continue to engage in illegal behavior with
impunity.
The breadth of the problem
Much of what passes for legal behavior might in fact be
illegal, but because prosecutorial practices are so rarely
challenged, it is difficult to define the universe of pros-
ecutorial misconduct. Because it is so difficult to discover,
much prosecutorial misconduct goes unchallenged, sug-
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gesting that the problem is much more widespread than
the many reported cases of prosecutorial misconduct
would indicate. As one editorial described the problem,
"[i]t would be like trying to count drivers who speed; the
problem is larger than the number of tickets would indi-
cate." (Editorial, Policing Prosecutors, ST. PETERSBURG
TIMES, July 12, 2003, at 16A.)
One of the most comprehensive studies of prosecuto-
rial misconduct was completed in 2003 by the Center for
Public Integrity, a nonpartisan organization that conducts
investigative research on public policy issues. A team of 21
researchers and writers studied the problem for three years
and examined 11,452 cases in which charges of prosecuto-
rial misconduct were reviewed by appellate court judges.
In the majority of cases, the alleged misconduct was ruled
harmless error or was not addressed by the appellate judges.
The center discovered that judges found prosecutorial mis-
conduct in more than 2,000 cases, in which they dismissed
charges, reversed convictions, or reduced sentences. (See
rights when they plead guilty.
Why is prosecutorial misconduct so widespread and
how did it reach this stage? An examination of the Supreme
Court's jurisprudence in this area may shed some light. The
Court has shielded prosecutors from scrutiny in a series of
cases that have narrowly defined the universe of behaviors
that constitute prosecutorial misconduct and the circum-
stances under which victims of such behaviors are entitled
to relief. Might these cases have emboldened prosecutors to
engage in misconduct, since they know that even if their be-
havior is discovered and challenged, courts will most likely
find the behavior to be "harmless error"?
The Supreme Court-
protecting prosecutorial power
The Supreme Court has established nearly impossible stan-
dards for obtaining the necessary discovery to seek judi-
cial review of some forms of prosecutorial misconduct.
Inappropriate or unethical charging decisions, intimidat-
The Supreme Court has established nearly
impossible standards for seeking the discovery
needed for judicial review.
Weinberg, supra.) In hundreds of additional cases, judges
believed that the prosecutorial behavior was inappropri-
ate but affirmed the convictions under the "harmless error"
doctrine. (See generally Chapman v. California, 386 U.S.
18, 22 (1967) (adopting the harmless error rule and decid-
ing that some constitutional errors are not significant or
harmful and therefore do not require an automatic reversal
of conviction).)
The cases investigated by the Center for Public Integrity
only scratch the surface of the issue, as they only represent
the cases in which prosecutorial misconduct was discovered
and litigated. Most of the prosecutorial practices that occur
behind closed doors, such as charging and plea bargaining
decisions and grand jury practices, are never revealed to the
public. Even after cases are indicted, defense attorneys are
not entitled to discover what occurred behind the scenes.
In the rare cases in which practices that appear to be illegal
are discovered, it is often impractical to challenge them, in
light of the Supreme Court's pro-prosecution decisions on
prosecutorial misconduct. Of course, there is no opportu-
nity to challenge any misconduct that may have occurred in
the more than 95 percent of all criminal cases that result in a
guilty plea, since defendants give up most of their appellate
ing conversations with witnesses, selective and vindictive
prosecutions, and grand jury abuse all occur in the privacy
of prosecution offices-away from the public and the par-
ties whose cases are affected by the harmful behavior. As
a result of the Supreme Court's rulings, see, e.g., United
States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996), prosecutors know
that it is highly unlikely that any of these behaviors will be
discovered by defense attorneys or anyone who might chal-
lenge them.
On the rare occasion when such misconduct is discov-
ered, judicial review is extremely limited. Under the harm-
less error rule, appellate courts affirm convictions if the
evidence supports the defendant's guilt, even if he or she
did not receive a fair trial. (See Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S.
570, 580 (1986) (holding that the harmless error standard
dictates that courts should not set aside convictions if the
error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt).) This rule
permits, perhaps even unintentionally encourages, prosecu-
tors to engage in misconduct during trial with the assurance
that so long as the evidence of the defendant's guilt is clear,
the conviction will be affirmed.
In addition to its constitutional power to reverse lower
court convictions, the Supreme Court's supervisory author-
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ity to oversee the implementation of criminal justice grants
the Court powers to regulate lower court procedures. For
example, in McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340
(1943), the Court concluded that when determining the ad-
missibility of evidence, it obeys the Constitution, and, un-
der its power of judicial supervision, formulates "civilized
standards of procedure and evidence." These standards are
to be applied in federal criminal prosecutions, in an effort
to deter governmental misconduct and preserve judicial
integrity. The Court's standards are satisfied by more than
simple adherence to due process laws and are derived from
considerations of "evidentiary relevance" and justice. (Id.
at 341.)
In United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 435 (1973),
however, the Supreme Court drastically curtailed the super-
visory power doctrine by reversing a lower court's use of
the power in a case involving questionable law enforcement
tactics. The Court invoked the separation of powers doc-
trine as it warned lower courts not to meddle in the business
of law enforcement. In a further effort to limit the reach of a
federal court's supervisory power, in United States v. Hast-
ing, 461 U.S. 499, 506 (1983), the Court held that judges
may not use the supervisory power doctrine to reverse con-
victions because of prosecutorial misconduct in cases in-
volving harmless error.
Civil lawsuits have proven equally ineffective as rem-
edies for prosecutorial misconduct. The Supreme Court
established a broad rule of absolute immunity from civil
liability for prosecutors in Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S.
409, 424-25 (1976). This rule immunizes prosecutors from
liability for acts "intimately associated with the judicial
phase of the criminal process." (Id. at 430.) The Court ex-
pressed concern that prosecutors might be deterred from
zealously pursuing their law enforcement responsibilities
if they faced the possibility of civil liability and suggested
that prosecutorial misconduct should be referred to state at-
torney disciplinary authorities.
The Supreme Court's decision to avoid the problem and
pass it on to state bar authorities has proven totally inef-
fective. All attorneys, including prosecutors, must abide by
their state's code of professional responsibility. Attorneys
who violate the code are subject to various forms of disci-
pline, including disbarment. However, the Center for Public
Integrity found only 44 cases since 1970 in which prosecu-
tors faced disciplinary proceedings for misconduct that in-
fringed on the constitutional rights of criminal defendants.
The misconduct in these cases included:
" Discovery violations;
* Improper contact with witnesses, defendants, judg-
es, or jurors;
" Improper behavior during hearings or trials;
" Prosecuting cases not supported by probable cause;
" Harassing or threatening defendants, defendants'
lawyers, or witnesses;
" Using improper, false, or misleading evidence;
" Displaying a lack of diligence or thoroughness in
prosecution; and
" Making improper public statements about a pending
criminal matter.
(Neil Gordon & Center for Public Integrity, Miscon-
duct and Punishment: State Disciplinary Authorities
Investigate Prosecutors Accused of Misconduct, at
www.publicintegrity.org.)
Out of the 44 attorney disciplinary cases,
" In seven, the court dismissed the complaint or did
not impose a punishment.
" In 20, the court imposed a public or private repri-
mand or censure.
" In 12, the prosecutor's license to practice law was
suspended.
" In two, the prosecutor was disbarred.
" In one, a period of probation was imposed in lieu of
a harsher punishment.
" In 24, the prosecutor was assessed the costs of the
disciplinary proceedings.
" In three, the court remanded the case for further
proceedings.
(Id.)
For many years, federal prosecutors refused to abide
by state disciplinary rules. In 1989, the Thornburgh Memo
declared that federal prosecutors would abide by internal
Justice Department rules rather than the ethical rules of the
state in which they practiced. (See In re Doe, 801 F. Supp.
478, 489 (D.N.M. 1992) (including the memorandum from
Richard Thornburgh (June 8, 1989)).) Although this memo-
randum was overturned by the Citizens Protection Act of
1998, 28 U.S.C. § 530B, the act simply returned prosecu-
tors to the status quo, which has proven highly ineffective
in deterring or punishing misconduct.
It is not surprising that very few prosecutors are referred
to state disciplinary authorities. In many ways, the phenom-
enon brings to mind the old saying "If you shoot at the king,
you'd better kill him." Since more than 95 percent of criminal
cases result in guilty pleas, every defense attorney knows that
future clients are at the mercy of the prosecutor, whose un-
fettered discretion determines what plea offers will be made
and to whom. (See DOJ, Bureau of Statistics, Felony Defen-
dants in Large Urban Counties, 2000 28 (December 2003)
at www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bsj/pub/pdf/fdlucOO.pdf.) Challenging
the bar license of an official who holds all the cards is risky
business, especially given the odds of prevailing. Prosecutors
are powerful and often popular political figures. Even when
referrals are made, bar authorities frequently decline to rec-
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ommend serious punishment, as the statistics from the Center
for Public Integrity indicate. Thus, referring prosecutors to
state bar authorities has proven to be a dismal failure.
The Court's rulings have sent a very clear message to
prosecutors-we will protect your practices from discov-
ery; when they are discovered, we will make it extremely
difficult for challengers to prevail; and as long as you mount
overwhelming evidence against defendants, we will not re-
verse their convictions if you engage in misconduct at trial.
Prosecutors are well aware of these facts, and although they
may not always intentionally set out to engage in miscon-
duct, it leads one to question whether the Supreme Court
has provided prosecutors with a comfort zone that fosters
and perhaps even encourages a culture of wrongdoing.
Brady violations: withholding
exculpatory evidence
The obligation of a prosecutor to reveal favorable, exculpa-
tory information about a criminal defendant is not only fair,
it is a constitutional requirement. In Brady v. Maryland, 373
U.S. 83 (1963), the Supreme Court held that a prosecutor's
failure to disclose evidence favorable to the defendant vio-
lated due process rights when the defendant had requested
such information. The Court expanded this rule in United
States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976), requiring prosecutors
to turn over exculpatory information to the defense even in
the absence of a request if such information is clearly sup-
portive of a claim of innocence. Professional ethical and
disciplinary rules in each state and the District of Columbia
reiterate and reinforce the duty to turn over information.
The obligation to reveal Brady information is ongoing and
is not excused even if the prosecutor acts in good faith.
Brady violations are among the most common forms of
prosecutorial misconduct. Because the obligation is expan-
sive, continuing, and not limited by the good faith efforts of
the prosecutor, great potential for wrongdoing exists. The
failure to provide Brady information can have dire conse-
quences for the defendant. In capital cases, Brady violations
have resulted in the execution of arguably innocent persons.
At the very least, withholding Brady information can deter-
mine the outcome of a trial.
Ken Armstrong and Maurice Possley, staff writers for
the Chicago Tribune, conducted a national study of 11,000
cases involving prosecutorial misconduct between 1963 and
1999. (Ken Armstrong & Maurice Possley, Verdict: Dishon-
or, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 10, 1999, at www.chicagotribune.com.)
The study revealed widespread, almost routine, violations of
the Brady doctrine by prosecutors across the country. They
discovered that since 1963, courts had dismissed homicide
convictions against at least 381 defendants because pros-
ecutors either concealed exculpatory information or pre-
sented false evidence. Of the 381 defendants, 67 had been
sentenced to death. Courts eventually freed approximately
30 of the 67 death row inmates, including two defendants
who were exonerated by DNA tests. One innocent defen-
dant served 26 years before a court reversed his conviction.
Armstrong and Possley suggest that this number represents
only a fraction of cases involving this type of prosecutorial
misconduct, since the study only considered cases where
courts convicted the defendant of killing another individual.
They also reported that the prosecutors who engaged in the
reported misconduct were neither convicted of a crime nor
barred from practicing law.
Another study by Bill Moushey of the Pittsburgh
Post-Gazette found similar results. (See Bill Moushey, Win
at All Costs, Prrr. POST-GAZETTE, at www.post-gazette.
com.) In his examination of more than 1,500 cases through-
out the nation, Moushey discovered that prosecutors rou-
tinely withhold evidence that might help prove a defendant
innocent. He found that prosecutors intentionally withheld
evidence in hundreds of cases during the past decade, but
courts overturned verdicts in only the most extreme cases.
Few defense attorneys have the time, resources, or ex-
pertise to conduct massive investigations of prosecution
officials. Nor should the discovery of prosecutorial miscon-
duct depend on investigative reporting. However, the cur-
rent law and practices result in the random and infrequent
discovery of Brady violations. Even when discovered, rem-
edies for the accused are inadequate, and punishment of the
offending prosecutor is rare.
Misconduct that leads to a death sentence
Prosecutorial misconduct in any case is reprehensible and
can lead to the wrongful conviction of the innocent. When
misconduct occurs in a capital case, however, the stakes are
the highest because an innocent person might be sentenced
to death. In fact, prosecutorial misconduct has been discov-
ered in an extraordinary number of capital cases. Although
various types of misconduct have been reported in capital
cases, a high percentage of these cases, 16-19 percent, 41
involve Brady violations. Delma Banks's case is one ex-
ample. (See Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668 (2004).) The
misconduct in Banks's case was so egregious that even the
U.S. Supreme Court, which had been unreceptive to claims
of prosecutorial misconduct in the past, provided relief.
In 1980, Texas authorities charged Delma Banks with the
death of 16-year-old Richard Whitehead. Prior to Banks's
trial, the prosecutor informed Banks's defense attorney that
he had turned over all discoverable information. In fact, the
prosecutor failed to reveal key exculpatory information about
two of its primary witnesses-Charles Cook and Robert Farr.
During the trial, Cook testified that Banks had confessed to
killing Whitehead and that he had seen Banks with blood on
his leg and in possession of a gun soon after Whitehead's
death. On cross-examination, Cook denied that he had re-
hearsed his testimony with law enforcement officials. Farr
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testified during the trial as well and corroborated key aspects
of Cook's testimony. During Farr's cross-examination, he
denied that law enforcement officials had promised him any-
thing in exchange for his testimony. Farr also testified during
the penalty phase of Banks's trial in support of his death sen-
tence. Banks was sentenced to death.
Banks filed several post-conviction motions in Texas
state courts. The court denied the first two motions on
grounds unrelated to alleged Brady violations, but the third
motion alleged that the prosecutor had failed to reveal ex-
culpatory information about Cook and Farr. The third mo-
tion was denied, but Banks raised the allegations of Brady
violations again in 1996 in a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Texas. Prior to an evidentiary hearing on Banks's motion,
the magistrate judge ordered the prosecutor to turn over the
prosecutor's trial files. Information in the prosecutor's files,
affidavits signed by Cook and the deputy sheriff, and evi-
dence uncovered at the hearing proved extraordinary and
egregious prosecutorial misconduct.
Hidden in the prosecutor's file was a 74-page transcript
10 minutes before Banks's scheduled execution by lethal
injection and after he had been strapped to the gurney, the
Supreme Court issued a stay of execution while it decided
whether to review Banks's case.
The Court ultimately decided to hear Banks's claims and
overturned his death sentence on February 24, 2004, by a
vote of seven to two. In reversing the Fifth Circuit's deci-
sion, the Supreme Court held that Banks had demonstrated
all three elements of a Brady prosecutorial misconduct
claim: "The evidence at issue must be favorable to the ac-
cused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is im-
peaching; that evidence must have been suppressed by the
State, either willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice must
have ensued. (Id. at 691, citing Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S.
263, 281-82 (1999).) The Court used particularly harsh lan-
guage in criticizing the prosecutor's conduct:
The State here nevertheless urges, in effect, that "the
prosecution can lie and conceal and the prisoner still
has the burden to ... discover the evidence." [ ... ] A
rule thus declaring "prosecutor may hide, defendant
It remains to be seen if Banks is a trend toward holding
the fire to prosecutors' feet or just an anomaly.
of Cook's interrogation by law enforcement officers and
prosecutors. During this interrogation, Cook was coached
repeatedly on what to say at trial and how to reconcile his
many inconsistent statements. In his affidavit, Cook stated
that he was warned that if he did not conform his testimony
to the state's evidence, he would "spend the rest of his life
in prison." (Id. at 684.) The deputy sheriff testified at the
hearing, and revealed, for the first time, that Farr, the other
witness, was a paid police informant who received $200 for
his assistance in Banks's case.
The prosecutor obviously knew that Cook's testimony
had been coached, even scripted, and that Farr was a paid
informant. These facts were clearly exculpatory and should
have been revealed to the defense prior to trial. Further-
more, the prosecutor knew that Cook and Farr had commit-
ted perjury when they denied these facts under oath during
the trial, yet he allowed these lies to become part of the
record and stressed them heavily in the punishment phase.
The magistrate judge granted partial relief after the evi-
dentiary hearing, recommending a writ of habeas corpus as
to the death sentence, but not the guilty verdict. The district
court adopted the magistrate's recommendation, but the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the district
court's grant of partial relief to Banks. In March 2003, just
must seek," is not tenable in a system constitutionally
bound to accord defendants due process.
(Id. at 696.)
Brady violations are very common in prosecutors' of-
fices, even violations as egregious as those in Banks's case.
The Supreme Court and lower courts have affirmed convic-
tions in cases involving similar violations. So why did the
Court provide relief for Delma Banks? There are a number
of possible explanations.
First, Banks faced death at the hands of the state in a
case where prosecutors deliberately withheld evidence.
The Court has always noted that "death is different," and
has provided more protections for defendants facing death
than for others. The Supreme Court undoubtedly has been
affected by the growing evidence of innocent people be-
ing freed from death row as a result of DNA evidence and
investigative reporting. Its death penalty jurisprudence in
recent years reflects more sensitivity to the rights of death
row inmates.
Second, the Banks case garnered widespread national
attention and support for Banks from an unusual combina-
tion of groups and individuals. One of the amicus briefs for
Delma Banks was submitted by a group of former federal
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judges, prosecutors, and public officials, including federal
judges John Gibbons, Timothy Lewis, and William Ses-
sions. Sessions is a former director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation. Thomas Sullivan, a former U.S. attorney for
the Northern District of Illinois, also joined this brief; and
the ABA also filed an amicus brief.
Third, some have speculated that the Supreme Court has
taken umbrage in what it perceives as defiance of its ju-
risprudence by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
There is certainly language in Banks that lends some cre-
dence to this theory. In Banks, the Court cites and relies
on its holding in Strickler v. Greene and chides the Fifth
Circuit for ignoring it: "Surprisingly, the Court of Appeals'
per curiam opinion did not refer to Strickler v. Greene, 527
U.S. 263, 119 S. Ct. 1936, 144 L. Ed. 2d 286 (1999), the
controlling precedent on the issue of" 'cause.' " (Banks v.
Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 692 n.12 (2004).)
Regardless of its reasons, the Court's holding in Banks
is a departure from its usual deference to prosecutors. It re-
mains to be seen whether Banks is the beginning of a trend
toward holding the fire to prosecutors' feet or an anomaly
attributable to Banks's death row status at a time when the
death penalty is under particular scrutiny. The latter char-
acterization is more likely, in light of the large body of
Supreme Court jurisprudence that defers to prosecutorial
power and discretion.
Why prosecutors escape punishment
Prosecutors are rarely punished for misconduct, even
when the misconduct causes tremendous harm to its vic-
tims. Of the 11,000 cases of alleged prosecutorial miscon-
duct examined by the Center for Public Integrity, the ap-
pellate courts reversed convictions, dismissed charges, or
reduced sentences in just over 2,000. However, in these
cases, most of the prosecutors suffered no consequences
and were not held accountable or even reprimanded for
their behavior.
Ken Armstrong and Maurice Possley found the same
lack of punishment and accountability in their 1999 study:
With impunity, prosecutors across the country have
violated their oaths and the law, committing the worst
kinds of deception in the most serious of cases....
They have prosecuted black men, hiding evidence the
real killers were white. They have prosecuted a wife,
hiding evidence her husband committed suicide. They
have prosecuted parents, hiding evidence their daugh-
ter was killed by wild dogs.
They do it to win.
They do it because they won't get punished.
(Armstrong & Possley, supra at C1.)
Armstrong and Possley found that a number of the
prosecutors not only totally escaped punishment or even
a reprimand but also advanced in their careers. In the 381
cases they examined in which appellate courts reversed
convictions based on either Brady violations or prosecutors
knowingly allowing lying witnesses to testify, the courts
described the behavior in terms such as "unforgivable," "in-
tolerable," "beyond reprehension," and "illegal, improper
and dishonest." (Armstrong & Possley, supra at C l.) Yet,
of those cases,
[o]ne was fired, but appealed and was reinstated with
back pay. Another received an in-house suspension
of 30 days. A third prosecutor's law license was sus-
pended for 59 days, but because of other misconduct
in the case. .... Not one received any kind of pub-
lic sanction from a state lawyer disciplinary agency
or was convicted of any crime for hiding evidence
or presenting false evidence, the Tribune found.
Two were indicted, but the charges were dismissed
before trial.
(Armstrong & Possley, supra at C1 .)
None of the prosecutors were publicly sanctioned or
charged with a crime. It is unclear whether any were sanc-
tioned by state bar authorities, because these proceedings
are not a matter of public record if the sanction was minor.
Several of the offending prosecutors advanced significantly
in their careers:
In Georgia, George "Buddy" Darden became a con-
gressman after a court concluded that he withheld
evidence in a case where seven men, later exoner-
ated, were convicted of murder and one was sen-
tenced to death. In New Mexico, Virginia Ferrara
failed to disclose evidence of another suspect in a
murder case. By the time the conviction was re-
versed she had become chief disciplinary counsel
for the New Mexico agency that polices lawyers
for misconduct.
(Armstrong & Possley, supra at C 1.)
If state bar authorities are hesitant to bring disciplinary
actions against prosecutors, it is not surprising that criminal
charges are even more infrequent. Yet much of prosecuto-
rial misconduct is criminal behavior. When prosecutors
knowingly put witnesses on the stand to testify falsely, they
suborn perjury. Subornation of perjury is a felony in all 50
states. Prosecutors are not above the law or immune from
prosecution. In fact, as the chief law enforcement officers,
they should be held to the highest standard of conduct. Yet
despite overwhelming evidence that prosecutors routinely
break the law, they are not punished. E
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